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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck KGAA v. 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.1 on the safe harbor provision of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act2 is the focus of the following discussion.  
Thus, this paper analyzes the recent decision and proposes a new 
standard for determining whether Federal Drug Administration 
(“FDA”)–related conduct is exempt from infringement under the 
safe harbor.  However, a thorough understanding of the section, its 
origins, and earlier judicial interpretations is beneficial in assessing 
the present scope of this important provision. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 19843—also known as the Hatch–Waxman Act (the “Act”)—
profoundly affected both the patent and food and drug laws and 
consequently, the manner in which the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry operates.4  It attempted to strike a balance among 
competing interests (particularly, innovator and generic 
pharmaceutical companies).5 
The Act amended the food and drug laws by, inter alia, 
creating a new procedure for approving generic drugs, which now 
includes antibiotics (but not biologics)—the Abbreviated New 
 
 1 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), vacating, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 2 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 3 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b (1984); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et al. 
(1984); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1984)). 
 4 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990). 
 5 See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(explaining the benefits of the Act to both brand name and generic drug manufacturers). 
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Drug Application (“ANDA”).6  It also altered the patent laws in 
various ways.  For example, the erosion of a patent’s term during 
FDA review is offset by extending the term for a period based on 
the length of agency review.7  In addition, the Act created a cause 
of action for patent infringement linked to the new ANDA 
procedure.8  It is considered a “theoretical” act of infringement to 
file an ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a patented drug 
before the pertinent patent expires.9  Only equitable remedies,10 
whose determination was expressly assigned to the court, are 
available to redress such theoretical infringement.11 
The Act also established an exemption to infringement.12  A 
patentee’s competitors can usually begin marketing an otherwise 
infringing product only when the patent expires, or shortly 
thereafter.13  The marketing of pharmaceuticals, however, is 
strictly regulated by the FDA, and FDA approval can, and usually 
does, take years.14  Moreover, under the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,15 a potential 
competitor could not even commence the testing required to seek 
FDA approval without infringing pertinent patents prior to their 
 
 6 See id. 
 7 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2000).  See Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 
1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 8 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 9 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).  See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d at 1326.  
This section also covers so-called “paper NDAs” or “§ 505(b)(2) applications.” 
 10 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2000).  Monetary damages are only awarded if the infringer 
commercially manufactured, used, offered to sell, or sold an approved drug or veterinary 
biological product within the United States or imported such products into the United 
States.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C) (2000). 
 11 See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00 C 5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2001); Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2001 WL 
477163, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001).  See generally Brian D. Coggio & Sandra A. 
Bresnick, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Waxman–Hatch Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
259 (1997); Brian D. Coggio & Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial Under The 
Waxman–Hatch Act: The Question Revisted and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155 
(2002). 
 12 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 13 See Brian D. Coggio & F. Dominick Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act: Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International Considerations, 
57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 162 (2002) [hereinafter Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor]. 
 14 See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–97 (2000). 
 15 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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expiration.16  Thus, because of this prohibition, the lengthy 
approval process was further prolonged, and the availability of 
drugs was delayed.17  This ruling was not limited to generic filings, 
but also impacted any pharmaceutical research, including studies 
to prepare an NDA.18  During the FDA-approval process, however, 
the patentee would still enjoy market exclusivity, even though the 
relevant patent(s) had expired.19  Congress addressed this situation 
by creating the safe harbor provision, section 271(e)(1), one 
provision of the Hatch–Waxman Act.20  Changes to the Act 
implemented by the FDA regulations effective August 2003, and 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003,21 did not affect the scope of the safe harbor 
exemption.22 
II. THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION 
Section 271(e)(1) of Title 35, United States Code, reads: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the 
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products. 
The section was intended to overrule the Roche decision and to 
exempt from infringement the bioequivalency testing needed to 
secure FDA approval of generic drugs.23  Indeed, at one time, it 
 
 16 See id. at 863. 
 17 See Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor, supra note 13, at 162. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).  See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 
U.S. 661 (1990); Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor, supra note 13. 
 21 Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2206 (2003). 
 22 See generally Brian D. Coggio, M. Veronica Mullally, & Todd L. Krause, Congress, 
FDA Address Hatch–Waxman Issues: Recent Agency Regulations and 2003 Medicare Act 
Clarify and Modify Generic Drug Law, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, s2 (col. 1). 
 23 See generally Allan M. Fox & Allan R. Bennett, The Legislative History of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (FDLI 1987). 
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had been argued that the section was limited to bioequivalency 
testing.24  This interpretation was rejected, and over the ensuing 
years, the section has been construed very broadly.25  This trend 
was abruptly halted by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA,26 although the Supreme 
Court’s opinion vacating that decision gave the scope of the 
exemption a “wide berth.”27 
A. Early Decisions Interpreting the Safe Harbor 
Early decisions addressing the safe harbor focused on the word 
“solely” and whether the alleged infringing “uses” related “solely” 
to the FDA approval process.28  These decisions, particularly 
Scripps Clinic, limited the scope of the exemption,29 while 
subsequent decisions focused on the phrase “reasonably related” 
and greatly expanded its scope.30  In fact, conduct that is 
“reasonably related” to securing FDA approval does not forfeit 
immunity even if that conduct has additional purposes.31  For 
 
 24 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98–857 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647). 
 25 See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 
1993); see also Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9, (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205–06 (D.N.J. 1994); Elan 
Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1931–33 
(N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 26 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 27 Merck KGAA  v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005). 
 28 See, e.g., Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1395–96 (holding that use of patented 
compound to obtain data for FDA approval and to support European patent filing was 
infringement); see also American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 102–03 
(D. Del. 1989).  The Federal Circuit in Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 
F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003) rediscovered the term “solely.” 
 29 Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1395–96.  But see Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus 
Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1932–33 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that 
“solely” is correctly read as modifying “uses,” not “reasonably related”).  The Elan court 
specifically held that the Scripps Clinic decision “misconstrues the exemption.” Id. at 
1932. 
 30 See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 
1991) (“Thus, Congress used this phrase to communicate its intention that the courts give 
parties some latitude in making judgments about the nature and extent of the otherwise 
infringing activities they would engage in as they sought to develop information to satisfy 
the FDA.”). 
 31 See id. at 1287–88. 
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example, in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the district court 
stated that “the inquiry is not generally whether the allegedly 
infringing party has engaged in conduct that shows that it has 
purposes beyond generating and presenting data to the FDA.”32  
Thus, the term “solely” is not determinative.33 
B. Standard for Applying the Safe Harbor 
Application of section 271(e)(1) requires a two-step analysis: 
(1) only infringing uses are analyzed under the section; and (2) 
only those infringing uses that are not “reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information” to the FDA are 
actionable.34  The district court in Intermedics framed the 
following test: 
Would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in 
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent 
prospect that the “use” in question would contribute 
(relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of 
information that [are] likely to be relevant in the processes 
by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the 
product?35 
In applying the exemption, the nature of the alleged infringing 
conduct, not the subjective intent of the purported infringer (e.g., a 
profit motive), is determinative.36  In Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. 
v. Ventritex, Inc.,37 the Federal Circuit held that activities designed 
 
 32 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278. 
 33 In affirming, the Federal Circuit held that “[r]eliance on section 271(e)(1) is not 
precluded by manifestation of an intent to commercialize upon FDA approval.”  
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524, 1528. 
 34 See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9 (D. Mass. 1995); NeoRX Corp. 
v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205–06 (D.N.J. 1994) (manufacturing product 
in U.S. for non–U.S. testing to generate data for foreign regulatory agencies is not 
protected). 
 35 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280. 
 36 See id. at 1280–81 (holding that only a defendant’s actual acts, as opposed to alleged 
future acts, were relevant and cautioned against considering underlying motives, indirect 
effects, and long range consequential benefits). 
 37 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that data, originally gathered for FDA 
submission, did not lose their protection because they were used to obtain financial 
backing). 
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to raise funds were within the safe harbor, and stated: “It would 
strain credulity to imagine that Congress was indifferent to the 
economics of developing and marketing drugs and medical devices 
when it enacted § 271(e)(1).”38  Again, the term “solely” was not 
determinative.39 
The Intermedics standard was used by various courts and 
expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Merck KGAA v. 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.40  It is submitted, however, that a new, 
more precise test can be formulated based on the Court’s recent 
decision.  This proposal is discussed in section IV, infra. 
C. Attempts to Limit the Safe Harbor 
Even before the Federal Circuit’s decision in Integra, some 
courts had limited the scope of the safe harbor.  For example, in 
Baxter Diagnostics Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp.,41 the district court 
found that Class I and II—as opposed to Class III—medical 
devices were not subject to section 271(e)(1) because the safe 
harbor and patent term restoration provisions (35 U.S.C. § 156) 
were linked.42  Since only patents covering Class III medical 
devices could be extended, only those patents (not patents covering 
Class I or II devices) were covered by the safe harbor.43  On 
 
 38 Id. at 1525. 
 39 See Chartex Int’l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prods. Corp., 1993 WL 306169, at *2–3 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 40 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005). 
 41 798 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that Class I and II devices were not 
subject to exemption). 
 42 Id. at 620.  See generally James M. Flaherty, Jr., PMA Primary: Synthesizing the 35 
U.S.C. § 156 Patent Term Extension, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Patent Infringement 
Exemption as Currently Applied to Medical Devices, and Medical Device Preemption 
Jurisprudence to Yield a Cohesive Solution Regarding Scope of Coverage, 56 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 339 (2001) [hereinafter Flaherty, PMA Primary]. 
 43 Baxter Diagnostics, 798 F. Supp. at 618–20.  In rendering its opinion, the court 
relied on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 672–73 (1990), which 
involved Class III medical devices.  Id. 
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reconsideration, the court reversed its decision.44  Subsequent 
decisions also rejected this view of “class” distinction.45 
In NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.,46 the court denied 
summary judgment of non-infringement where the defendant had 
manufactured the patented product in the United States and 
shipped it overseas for testing to support foreign regulatory 
approval.47  Apparently, the court found that the accused conduct 
lacked any link to an FDA filing and was therefore not exempt.48  
Subsequently, the court in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,49 relying 
on NeoRX, stated: “Biogen’s shipment of Avonex samples [the 
patented product] produced in the United States to foreign 
regulatory authorities was not related to FDA requirements or 
other federal law and, therefore, was outside the statutory 
exemption.”50  The Biogen court also held that stockpiling of a 
drug in anticipation of FDA approval was “far more than merely 
do[ing] clinical trials for submission to the FDA” and thus was 
outside the safe harbor.51 
In Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.,52 Infigen 
alleged infringement of a patent covering a process for activating 
bovine oocytes for use in cloning cattle.53  The court rejected the 
safe harbor exemption, adopted the rationale of the initial Baxter 
Diagnostics decision, and limited the type of patents embraced by 
section 271(e)(1): 
 
 44 See Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 954 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 
1996); see also Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 
2001). 
 45 See, e.g., Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d, 
122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chartex 
Int’l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prods. Corp., 1993 WL 30619, at *2 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 46 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994). 
 47 Id. at 207–09. 
 48 See id. at 209. 
 49 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 50 Id. at 397 n.1. 
 51 Id. at 396–97. 
 52 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999); see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. 
Viacell Inc., No. Civ.A. 02–148 GMS, 2003 WL 548496 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2003) 
(“umbilical cord blood stem cells units are not regulated by the FDCA and therefore 
cannot be considered a drug” within purview of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
 53 See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 969. 
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Thus, holders of certain patents received an extended 
period of protection under the patent [§ 156]; in exchange, 
they were barred from collecting damages caused by 
otherwise infringing acts and by persons engaging in such 
acts solely for uses reasonably related to complying with 
FDA requirements.  See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671, 110 S. 
Ct. 2683.54 
According to the court’s reading of Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,55 only patents (other than those covering generic 
drugs) whose terms could be extended under section 156 were 
subject to the safe harbor.56 
A patent holder whose patent is ineligible for the five-year 
[patent term] extension [under § 156] is not precluded from 
suing for infringement damages (except in unusual 
circumstances not present here, such as those involving 
patents pertaining to “follow-on” drug products rather than 
pioneers.).57 
Under this reasoning, research tool patents would not be 
subject to the safe harbor exemption.58  The Infigen court also held 
that the research was not exempt under the common law research 
exception.59  The Infigen court, however, misperceived the holding 
in Eli Lilly, which did not limit the patents covered by section 
271(e)(1) to those eligible for term extensions under section 156.60  
To the contrary, the Court recognized that in “some relatively rare 
 
 54 Id. at 980.  At least one commentator agrees with this limitation of the safe harbor 
provision. See Flaherty, PMA Primary, supra note 42, at 345–46. 
 55 496 U.S. 661, 672 (1990). 
 56 See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 57 Id. (emphasis added). 
 58 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29–30 
n.12, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–1237) 
[hereinafter Brief for the United States].  The United States stated that this symmetry 
between sections 156 and 271(e)(1) was “another indication that Congress did not intend 
to include research tools within the scope of the inventions to which section 271(e)(1) 
applies.” Id. 
 59 See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 981.  The Federal Circuit has held that the common 
law research exemption is essentially non–existent. See also Madey v. Duke University, 
307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 60 See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661. 
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situations,” patents will not be eligible for an extension, but still be 
subject to the exemption of section 271(e)(1).61  Although the 
Court could not “readily imagine such situations,”62 countless 
possibilities do exist. 
D. The Safe Harbor Is Construed Broadly 
With minor exceptions, the courts have adopted an expansive 
reading of the safe harbor exemption.  Representative of this 
liberal interpretation is Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
Inc.63  There, Amgen sued Hoechst for infringement of Amgen’s 
patents on erythropoietin (EPO) and also sought a declaratory 
judgment that its patents would be infringed if Hoechst received 
FDA approval.64  The Amgen court reviewed six potentially 
infringing activities: (1) exports of EPO; (2) purity testing; (3) 
manufacture of consistency batches; (4) characterization of the 
product; (5) viral clearance tests in Europe; and (6) radio labeling, 
and found that each was protected by the safe harbor.65 
As to the first category, Hoechst exported EPO to its Japanese 
affiliate for use as a reference in evaluating and improving its own 
manufacturing process.66  Amgen contended that the shipment was 
not reasonably related to FDA approval because Hoechst had not 
sought approval of that particular process.67  The court disagreed.68  
Since an alternative process would require FDA approval, and 
FDA guidelines supported the use of a reference standard from one 
process to evaluate an alternative process, the conduct was exempt, 
even though the data would not be included in Hoechst’s FDA 
submission.69 
 
 61 Id. at 671–72. 
 62 Id. at 672 n.4. 
 63 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).  In reaching its decision, the Amgen court 
specifically criticized the decision in Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Amgen 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107–08. 
 64 Id. at 106. 
 65 Id. at 108–11. 
 66 Id. at 109. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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In an attempt to analyze its product for purity, Hoechst 
conducted tests to identify pyrogens.70  Amgen asserted that the 
tests were infringing since not all the resulting data would be 
submitted to the FDA; rather, some were actually submitted to 
European regulatory authorities.71  Hoechst claimed the tests were 
performed to confirm the purity of its EPO for use in clinical 
trials.72  The court held that even if the data obtained from the tests 
were insufficient for FDA purposes, the tests were nevertheless 
reasonably related to FDA clinical trials and thus exempt.73 
Hoechst’s preparation of commercial-scale batches of EPO was 
also accused of infringement, primarily because the batches were 
abandoned due to lack of potency.74  Amgen asserted that this 
abandonment indicated that the manufacture of these batches was 
not reasonably related to the FDA-approval process.75  The court, 
however, held that the conduct was protected because the batches 
would likely lead to the generation of useful information regarding 
the pharmaceutical product.76 
The court held that the remaining activities were protected, 
even though some were not necessary to secure FDA approval.77  
For example, Amgen contended that Hoechst’s worldwide efforts 
to gain approval for its version of EPO were not exempt.78  The 
court disagreed and held that under Amgen’s position, the 
disclosure of information obtained during clinical trials to anyone 
other than FDA would void the exemption.79  Instead, the court 
concluded that all of Hoechst’s activities challenged by Amgen 
were reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval.  Thus, the 
infringement action was dismissed.80 
 
 70 Id.. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 110. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id.. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 110–11. 
 80 The court’s ruling also eliminated Amgen’s right to declaratory relief because it 
could not establish a controversy satisfying the constitutional requirements.  Although 
Hoechst would undoubtedly market EPO upon FDA approval and a “controversy” was 
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The broad scope of the exemption is also exemplified by 
Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,81 where the court 
held that the safe harbor applied to post-approval clinical studies 
required by the FDA.82  There, the FDA granted Bausch & Lomb 
tentative approval of its extended-wear contact lens, provided it 
conducted a post-approval study investigating any adverse 
effects.83  The court noted that “[n]owhere in [the] language [of the 
statute] . . . does Congress show an intent to limit the section 
271(e)(1) exception solely to pre-approval activities.”84  Since the 
FDA had required the studies, they certainly were “reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” to that 
agency and were therefore exempt.85 
Another decision illustrating the liberal interpretation of 
section 271(e)(1) is Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp.,86 
where the use of the patented invention in clinical trials was 
exempt,87 even though the FDA had expressed concerns that the 
trials were not adequate for FDA submission.  According to the 
patentee, under these circumstances, the trials could not be 
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval.88  This argument 
was dismissed: 
[U]nless the court is confronted with the extreme case in 
which either it is clear that certain otherwise infringing 
activities are outside the FDA approval process or the FDA 
 
present, the court held that numerous factors militated against exercising jurisdiction at 
that time.  First, not only was FDA approval an uncertain event, but the product or the 
process used by Hoechst might undergo changes that could be material to an 
infringement analysis, thus rendering any judgment moot.  Second, because Hoechst 
would infringe only when its conduct exceeded the safe harbor, the court declined to 
upset the balance envisioned by Congress by allowing the declaratory judgment action to 
proceed before marketing began.  Id. at 112–13. 
 81 235 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. Del. 2002). 
 82 Id. at 376. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 376. 
 85 Id.; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 
455–56 (D. Md. 2005) (rejecting the argument that safe harbor “applies only to drugs 
which have not yet been approved by the FDA, [but it can cover] post approval activities 
associated with a drug that is already on the market”). 
 86 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002). 
 87 Id. at 202–05. 
 88 Id. at 200. 
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itself affirmatively indicates that a party’s activities are not 
reasonably related to obtaining its approval, the court will 
not find that accused activities that a defendant objectively 
believes could generate information that is likely to be 
relevant to the FDA approval process are not “reasonably 
related” to obtaining FDA approval.89 
Put simply, the court would not limit the scope of the safe 
harbor unless an “extreme case” was shown.90 
The broadest interpretation of section 271(e)(1) is articulated in 
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,91 where 
the court ruled that Bristol-Myers’ drug discovery efforts using 
Rhone–Poulenc Rorer’s (“RPR”) patented intermediates to 
investigate and/or identify potential new drug candidates were 
exempt.92  The Bristol-Myers court held that all pharmaceutical 
research, including basic research, the synthesis of new drug 
candidates, their initial testing, and the determination of which 
drug candidates to pursue, was protected by the safe harbor.93  
Indeed, the court held that “[i]t would be nonsensical for the 
exemption to apply only in the development process after a drug 
candidate was identified” because infringement would necessarily 
occur before the protection of the safe harbor was reached.94  As 
discussed infra, this “gap” in protection is noted in Judge 
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. V. 
Merck KGAA.95 
 
 89 Id. at 203.  See also Ino Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sensormedics Corp., C.A. No. 00–6033 
(AET) (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2003) Mem. Op. at 4–5 (holding sales of nitrous oxide to holders 
of investigational new drug applications was protected by the safe harbor). 
 90 Nexell Therapeutics 199 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
 91 No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).  RPR’s patent claimed 
semi–synthetic processes for synthesizing the drug taxol and four intermediates used in 
preparing that drug. 
 92 Id. at *6. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.  It is ironic that in many cases, a party (other than a generic) must infringe before 
it is eligible for protection under the safe harbor.  See generally Janice M. Mueller, No 
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement 
for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (2001). 
 95 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. V. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 872–78 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
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Under Bristol-Myers, it appeared that all pharmaceutical 
research conducted to identify new drugs was exempt.96  In 
addition, since the term “patented invention” is not limited to 
patents extendable by section 156, a defendant could contend that 
the use of patented pipettes during drug discovery is protected by 
the safe harbor.97  In view of Merck v. Integra Lifesciences, 
however, Bristol-Myers is not the law. 
III. MERCK V. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES 
A. The Federal Circuit Decision 
Section 271(e)(1), research tool patents, and related damages 
took center stage in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA.98  
There, Integra alleged that Merck had directly infringed and 
induced Scripps to infringe five patents by encouraging Scripps’ 
tests on a target drug and related compounds.99  Significantly, the 
research was conducted after Scripps had discovered that the target 
compound was potentially useful in treating cancer.100  The 
defendants argued that their conduct was exempt under section 
271(e)(1).101  The jury disagreed and returned a verdict for Integra, 
awarding $15 million in damages.102  In a 2-1 decision, the Federal 
 
 96 See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 C 8833, 2001 
WL 1512597, at *6.  This, of course, does not include the filing of an ANDA or a paper 
NDA with a paragraph IV certification, either of which is an act of infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). 
 97 In passing, the Bristol-Myers court quoted one portion to the legislative history of the 
Act (later emphasized in Integra Lifesciences), which notes that the safe harbor “does not 
result in the total extinguishment of the patent owner rights, because the patent owner 
still maintains a right to exclude others from the commercial marketplace.” Id. at *6 n.6 
(citation omitted).  Quite possibly, the court may have believed that the RPR patents 
would be infringed and a lawsuit would be instituted when Bristol-Myers commercialized 
the resulting product.  But the final product could well be made without using (i.e., 
infringing) the patented intermediates.  Thus, an action for infringement of the RPR 
patents might never be filed, and the patents might well have become commercially 
worthless.  This same situation can apply to research tool patents. 
 98 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 99 Id. at 862–64. 
 100 Id. at 863. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 869. 
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Circuit, per Judge Rader, affirmed the verdict, but vacated the 
award of damages and remanded the case for further 
consideration.103  In its decision, the court limited the scope of 
section 271(e)(1) and suggested that the use of research tools, 
which were not even at issue in the case, in basic drug discovery 
was not exempt from patent infringement.104  Judge Newman 
dissented.105 
The Federal Circuit opined that the Hatch–Waxman Act had 
two key purposes: (1) to extend the term of pharmaceutical patents 
to compensate for delays in the FDA approval process (section 
156); and (2) to overrule Roche v. Bolar to ensure that the 
marketing of pharmaceuticals, particularly generic drugs, would 
not be unnecessarily delayed.106  As support, the court referenced 
to the legislative history, which authorizes “‘a limited amount of 
testing so that generic manufactures can establish the 
bioequivalency of a generic substitute’.”107  Despite its emphasis 
on generic drugs, the court noted that clinical trials were exempt 
under section 271(e)(1).108 
The court concluded that the Scripps’ research did not develop 
information for submission to the FDA, but was conducted to 
identify the best potential candidate for human testing.109  The 
Supreme Court, however, indicated that this very conduct was 
exempt.110  The crux of the Federal Circuit’s decision reads: 
The focus of the entire exemption is the provision of 
information to the FDA.  Activities that do not directly 
produce information for the FDA are already straining the 
relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor.  The 
term “reasonably” permits some activities that are not 
 
 103 Id. at 872. 
 104 Id. at 871. 
 105 Id. at 872. 
 106 Id. at 865. 
 107 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98–857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2692).  The court also noted that the legislative history indicated that the “nature of the 
interference” with the rights of the patentee could not be “substantial,” but only “de 
minimis.” 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–78 (1990). 
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themselves the experiments that produce FDA information 
to qualify as “solely for uses reasonably related” to clinical 
tests for the FDA.  Again, however, the statutory language 
limits the reach of that relationship test. 
In this case, the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not 
clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but only 
general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical 
compounds.  The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs 
that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA 
approval.  For instance, the FDA does not require 
information about drugs other than the compound featured 
in an Investigational New Drug application.  Thus, the 
Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not “solely for uses 
reasonably related” to clinical testing for FDA.111 
The court again stressed that the purpose of the Act was to 
“expedite FDA approval of a generic version of a drug already on 
the market. . . .  Therefore, the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor covers those 
pre-expiration activities ‘reasonably related’ to acquiring FDA 
approval of a drug already on the market.”112  Relying on the 
Intermedics test, the court stated that the safe harbor exempts 
research that “‘would contribute (relatively directly)’ to 
information the FDA considers in approving a drug.”113  But the 
safe harbor does not exempt drug discovery efforts simply because 
the resulting product requires FDA approval.114  Indeed, “[t]he safe 
harbor does not reach any exploratory research that may rationally 
form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.”115  Significantly, 
the Supreme Court endorsed this conclusion.116 
Turning to research tool patents (which were not implicated by 
the facts as presented), the Federal Circuit noted that extending 
 
 111 Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 866 (emphasis added).  But see H.R. Rep. No. 98–
857 (Pt. 1) at 45 (1984) (“A party which develops such information, but decides not to 
submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development was done to 
determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought.”). 
 112 Integra Lifesciences 331 F.3d at 867. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. (emphasis added). 
 116 Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005). 
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section 271(e)(1) to cover Scripps’ research “would effectively 
vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool 
patents” and would certainly not be a “de minimis encroachment 
on the rights of the patentee.”117  Thus, Bristol–Myers, which is not 
even mentioned in the court’s opinion, is clearly not the law.118 
In her dissent, Judge Newman opined that the common law 
research exemption should exempt early pharmaceutical research, 
and section 271(e)(1) should protect further developmental efforts 
until commercialization.119  Otherwise, infringing research is 
necessary, and this would create a “gap” before the safe harbor 
exemption was reached.120  Her concerns were not limited to 
pharmaceutical research; she was disturbed that technological 
progress121 would be hampered if all research, particularly basic 
research, were potentially infringing.122 
 
 117 Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867. 
 118 The court vacated the damages award because it was not clear that the lower court 
properly analyzed the hypothetical negotiation before the infringement began.  Indeed, 
the value of a license could be “dramatically different” at a later date.  In determining the 
amount, the court noted that the level of risk associated with the technology should be 
assessed, as well as a party’s inability to predict success, and the number of patent 
licenses necessary to conduct the research (“patent stacking”). Id. at 870–71.  In 
particular, the Federal Circuit stated that the royalty would be lower if negotiated at the 
beginning of the research, rather than closer to product launch.  On remand, Integra was 
awarded $6.375 million as damages. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 96 CV 
1307–B (AJB) 2004 WL 2284001, *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).  Unfortunately, the 
methodology used to determine the amount did not relate to research tool patents.  See 
generally Donald Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267 
(2002); Michael J. Stimson, Damages for Infringement of Research Tool Patents: The 
Reasonableness of Reach Through Royalties, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2003). 
 119 Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 875. 
 120 Id. at 875–77. 
 121 See id. at 875–77.  “[T]he patent system both contemplates and facilitates research 
into patented subject matter, whether the purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation 
or comparison or improvement.” Id. at 875. 
 122 See id.  Since, in many areas of technology, technical information is not published 
apart from patents, how can the technology be studied, improved or “design[ed] around,” 
if such efforts constitute patent infringement?  If these efforts were prohibited, why then, 
according to Judge Newman, must patents comply with the written description and best 
mode requirements?  Certainly, when the patents expire 17–20 years later, the disclosures 
would be ancient.  Judge Newman posits that these requirements indicate that 
contemporaneous (non–infringing) experiments are contemplated, i.e., the patented 
invention is not placed “on ice” and protected from further study for years. Id. 
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According to Judge Newman, when basic research ends and 
commercial development begins, the common law research 
exemption expires.123  In this case, however, the developmental 
work was protected by section 271(e)(1).124  While she agreed with 
the limited origins of the section, she recognized that its scope had 
been extended;125 she agreed, however, that it did not reach back 
down the chain of experimentation to cover basic research.126  
According to her, however, those research efforts should be 
exempt under the common law research exemption.127  Judge 
Newman’s opinion seemingly ignores Madey v. Duke 
University,128 which would indicate that Scripps’ early research 
efforts were not protected by the common law research exemption, 
although the district court had ruled otherwise.129 
As to research tools, Judge Newman differentiated between the 
use of a tool to conduct research and research on the tool itself.130  
Research “on” the tool should be exempt, but the use of a tool “for 
the purpose for which it was made” infringes.131  Under Judge 
Newman’s view, if a research tool, e.g., an assay, is used to 
identify new drug candidates—the “purpose for which it was 
made”—that conduct should infringe.132  Unfortunately, the 
relationship between research tool patents and the safe harbor 
exemption was not addressed by the Supreme Court.133 
 
 123 Id. at 876. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 877. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 878. 
 128 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 129 See id. at 1352. 
 130 Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 877–78. 
 131 Id. at 878 n.10 (citing Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct 2372, 2382 n.7 (2005) 
(quoting Judge Newman’s dissent: 331 F.3d at 878, “Use of an existing tool in one’s 
research is quite different from study of the tool itself”).  
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B. The Arguments Before the Supreme Court 
Before the Supreme Court, Merck stressed the dire public 
policy ramifications of the Federal Circuit’s decision.134  Indeed, 
unless the decision was reversed: 
The patent holder would be able to bar all laboratory tests 
using the compound—or, as in this case, any structurally 
similar compound. . . .  Drug innovators and researchers 
will have to sit on their hands awaiting patent expiration 
before starting to conduct the battery of experiments 
necessary to qualify a potentially path-breaking new 
drug . . . .  Consequently, the patent holder will enjoy a de 
facto patent-term extension, while potential treatment for 
innumerable diseases and conditions will be denied to 
patients for a decade or more after all patents expire.135 
The brief summarized the preclinical testing necessary for an 
IND to demonstrate that Scripps’ research was exempt.136  Since it 
did not need to establish that all drug discovery efforts were 
exempt to prevail, Merck stressed that the alleged infringing 
conduct “reflected a shift from basic discovery to inquiry into how 
this particular structure would work as a drug.”137  Thus, once 
screening ends, and “a particular structure” shows promise, efforts 
to optimize that drug by experiments on “related drugs” is exempt 
as long as “the experiment relates to a topic that is of interest to the 
FDA.”138  According to Merck, a “world of difference [exists] 
between basic exploratory research or screening of untested 
structures in test tubes and the drug optimization and preclinical 
research [necessary in an IND].”139  The Supreme Court followed 
this generalized approach in stating that “basic scientific research” 
is not exempt under the safe harbor.140 
 
 134 See Brief for Petitioner at 41–43, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. 
Ct. 2372 (No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 135 Id. at 4. 
 136 Id. at 7. 
 137 Id. at 13. 
 138 Id. at 39. 
 139 Id. at 40. 
 140 See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2005).  
Although research tool patents were “not at issue,” the danger to such patents, according 
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Integra contended that only preclinical studies directed to 
safety—not efficacy—conducted in accordance with the FDA’s 
“Good Laboratory Practices” were exempt.141  Since Scripps’ tests 
did not satisfy this requirement, they were irrelevant to the FDA 
approval process.142  In support of its position, Integra cited FDA 
regulations requiring that preclinical tests on safety be included in 
an IND application, but such regulations did not require any tests 
on the drug’s efficacy.143  Similarly, tests on related compounds 
are relevant to safety, not efficacy, and thus are not within the 
exemption unless performed under GLP, and Scripps’ tests were 
not.144  In particular, efforts to identify “the best drug candidate to 
subject to future clinical testing” do not generate information for 
the FDA because the tests are not on the final product.145  
Accordingly, Scripps’ research was not exempt.146 
In its reply, Merck argued that the exemption could apply even 
before Scripps settled upon the optimum structure.147  Rather, 
“[s]ince the tweaking to optimize structure is an essential part of 
the preclinical process,” such research must be protected.148 
Setting the stage for the Supreme Court’s decision, Merck 
noted that application of the exemption entails two inquires—one 
temporal and one substantive.149  First, how far along the drug 
development process must research be before the exemption 
applies?150  Second, what categories of information (i.e., types of 
research) are relevant to the FDA’s regulatory role?151  As shown 
 
to Merck, would be “limited,” and therefore, this consideration had “little bearing” on 
Congressional intent regarding the safe harbor.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 
33, 41, 43. 
 141 Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 4, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–1237). 
 142 Id. at 24. 
 143 Id. at 5–8. 
 144 Id. at 9, 37–38. 
 145 Id. at 27. 
 146 Id. at 27–28. 
 147 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. 
Ct. 2372 (No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 5. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 5–6. 
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below, the Supreme Court addressed both questions.  It could be 
argued, however, that the answer to the second inquiry is much 
clearer than that to the first. 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Scalia, who had authored the Court’s decision in Eli 
Lilly v. Medtronic, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.152  
The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the 
case so that the evidence could be reviewed under the standard set 
forth in the jury instructions, which the Court expressly 
endorsed.153  After summarizing the general legal principles, the 
Court detailed the alleged infringing research.154  These facts—as 
specifically articulated by the Court—are a useful backdrop in 
interpreting the scope of the safe harbor in light of the Court’s 
legal pronouncements. 
In 1988, Merck funded Scripps’ research on angiogenesis, a 
process by which new blood vessels emanate from existing 
vessels.155  In 1994, Scripps succeeded in reversing tumor growth 
using, inter alia, a cyclic RGD peptide provided by Merck under a 
research agreement.156  In 1995, based upon this early success, 
Merck entered a new agreement to fund further research by 
Scripps, including in vitro and in vivo testing of RGD peptides, to 
identify a “primary candidate” for clinical testing.157  Scripps 
conducted additional experiments on RGD peptides supplied by 
Merck (EMD 66203 and two closely related derivatives) to 
evaluate their suitability “as potential drug candidates.”158  The 
tests measured “the efficacy, specificity, and toxicity of the 
particular peptides . . . and evaluated their mechanism of action 
 
 152 Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 153 Id. at 2384. 
 154 Id. at 2377–79. 
 155 Id. at 2377–78. 
 156 Id. at 2378.  One of the patented peptides was used as a control in certain 
experiments, but this conduct was not specifically address by the Federal Circuit or the 
Supreme Court. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
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and pharmacokinetics in animals.”159  Based upon these tests, 
Scripps decided that EMD 121974 was “the most promising” 
candidate to evaluate in humans.160  On July 18, 1996, as the 
Merck/Scripps collaboration was continuing, Integra filed suit for 
patent infringement.161  The issue at trial focused on whether the 
post-1995 research fell within the safe harbor exemption.162 
The Court initially stated that “the statutory text [of § 
271(e)(1)] makes clear that it provides a wide berth for the use of 
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory 
process.”163  Furthermore, the “exemption from infringement 
extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably 
related to the development and submission of any information 
under the FDCA.”164  Lower court decisions interpreting the scope 
of the safe harbor will undoubtedly be guided by its “wide berth” 
of protection.165  Just how wide will be determined on a case-by-
case basis.  The Court’s decision, however, can be conveniently 
parsed to answer discreet questions related to the scope of the 
exemption.  This analysis follows. 
1. Generic v. Branded Products 
The safe harbor is not limited to the preparation of generic 
(“ANDA”) applications.166  Rather, it includes NDAs, BLAs, and 
so-called paper-NDAs (§ 505(b)(2) applications).167  As the Court 
stated: 
[Congress] did [not] create an exemption applicable only to 
the research relevant to filing an ANDA for approval of a 
generic drug.  Rather, it exempted from infringement all 
 
 159 Id.  Somewhat later, in November 1996, Merck initiated a formal project to guide 
one of the RGD peptides (EMD 85189) through regulatory approval.  Merck later 
switched focus to EMD 121974. Id. at 2379. 
 160 Id. at 2378. 
 161 Id. at 2379. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 2380 (emphasis added). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456 
(D. Md. 2005). 
 166 See, e.g., Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005). 
 167 See id. 
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uses of patented compounds “reasonably related” to the 
process of developing information for submission under 
any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or 
distribution of drugs.168 
The Federal Circuit opinion had caused some confusion on this 
point. 
2. Clinical Trials v. Preclinical Tests 
Addressing the issue raised by the petition for certiorari, the 
Court held that the safe harbor exemption is not limited to clinical 
trials, but can encompass preclinical tests.169  As the Court stated: 
[The exemption] necessarily includes preclinical studies of 
patented compounds that are appropriate for submission to 
the FDA in the regulatory process.  There is simply no 
room in the statute for excluding certain information from 
the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in 
which it is developed or the particular submission [INDA v. 
NDA] in which it could be included.170 
. . . . 
 [T]he FDA requires that applicants include in an IND 
summaries of the pharmacological, toxicological, 
pharmacokinetic, and biological qualities of the drug in 
animals. . . .  The primary (and, in some cases, only) way in 
which a drug maker may obtain such information is 
through preclinical in vitro and in vivo studies.171 
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain what studies are 
“appropriate for submission.”172  Ironically, the Court also held 
that an FDA submission is not necessary for the exemption to 
apply.173  Regardless, the holding demonstrates (clearly shows) 
 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 2380. 
 170 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 171 Id. at 2381 (emphasis added). 
 172 Id. at 2380. 
 173 Id. at 2382. 
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that the types of research potentially included within safe harbor 
protection are quite broad.174 
3. Safety v. Efficacy Tests 
In rejecting Integra’s argument that only preclinical safety tests 
are exempt from Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor protection, the 
Court held that preclinical tests evaluating either a drug’s safety or 
efficacy are potentially subject to the safe harbor.175 
[T]he FDA does not evaluate the safety of proposed clinical 
experiments in a vacuum; rather, as the statute and 
regulations reflect, it asks whether the proposed clinical 
trial poses an “unreasonable risk.” . . . Accordingly, the 
FDA directs that an IND must provide sufficient 
information for the investigation to “make his/her own 
unbiased risk-benefit assessment of the appropriateness of 
the proposed trial.” . . . Such information necessarily 
includes preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy in 
achieving particular results.176 
In addition, preclinical tests (e.g., safety, efficacy, mode of 
action, etc.) need not be performed under good laboratory practice 
requirements to come within safe harbor.177  Integra’s argument 
that preclinical studies (other than safety) must comply with these 
standards was rejected.178 
[T]he FDA’s requirement that preclinical studies be 
conducted under “good laboratory practices” applies only 
to experiments on drugs “to determine their safety.” . . . 
The good laboratory practice regulations do not apply to 
preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy, mechanism of 
action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics.  Second, FDA 
regulations do not provide that even safety-related 
experiments not conducted in compliance with good 
laboratory practices regulations are not suitable for 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 2381. 
 176 Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2005)). 
 177 Id. at 2381–82. 
 178 Id. 
COGGIO 2/1/2006  5:59 PM 
2005] SCOPE OF THE “SAFE HARBOR” PROVISION 25 
submission in an IND.  Rather, such studies must include 
“a brief statement of the reason for the noncompliance.”179 
Thus, all preclinical trials are potentially exempt under the 
safe harbor regardless of their compliance with good 
laboratory practice. 
4. Submission Of Data To The FDA 
The use of patented compounds in experiments which generate 
data that are not submitted to the FDA may still come within the 
safe harbor.180 
[T]he use of a patented compound in experiments that are 
not themselves included in a “submission of information” 
to the FDA does not, standing alone, render the use 
infringing.  The relationship of the use of a patented 
compound in a particular experiment to the “development 
and submission of information” to the FDA does not 
become more attenuated (or less reasonable) simply 
because the data from that experiment are left out of the 
submission that is ultimately passed along to the FDA.181 
Indeed, it would seem beyond dispute that test results need not 
be submitted for the exemption to apply, especially since the 
Court’s opinion focuses on this particular issue. 
This case presents the question whether uses of patented 
inventions in preclinical research, the results of which are 
not ultimately included in a submission to the [FDA], are 
exempted from infringement by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).182 
Obviously, the Court did not require an FDA “submission” for 
the exemption to apply.183 
 
 179 Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 58.3(d)). 
 180 Id. at 2383. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 2376. 
 183 Id. at 2383. 
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5. Tests on Non-Submitted Compounds 
The Court held that the safe harbor is not limited to tests on the 
specific compound that is the subject of an FDA submission.184  
Thus, “drug optimization” or “tweaking” (to use Merck’s terms) 
can be exempt and therefore a final drug candidate need not be 
identified before the exemption can apply.185  This aspect of the 
Court’s ruling is particularly significant to pharmaceutical 
companies.  It does not follow . . . that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption 
from infringement categorically excludes . . . experimentation on 
drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission.186 
[E]ven at late stages in the development of a new drug, 
scientific testing is a process of trial and error.  In the vast 
majority of cases, neither the drug maker nor its scientists 
have any way of knowing whether an initially promising 
candidate will prove successful over a battery of 
experiments.  That is the reason they conduct the 
experiments.  Thus, to construe § 271(e)(1), as the Court of 
Appeals did, not to protect research conducted on patented 
compounds for which an IND is not ultimately filed is 
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities 
necessary to seek approval of a generic drug[.]187 
. . . . 
Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for 
experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory 
approval: At least where a drug maker has a reasonable 
basis for believing that a patented compound may work, 
through a particular biological process, to produce a 
particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in 
research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include 
in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related” 
 
 184 Id. at 2382. 
 185 Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 1. 
 186 Id. at 2382 (emphasis added). 
 187 Id. at 2382–83 (emphasis added). 
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to the “development and submission of information 
under . . . Federal Law.”188 
It is clear that the safe harbor is not limited to experiments on a 
single drug candidate.189  Indeed, from 1995–98, Scripps 
conducted in vitro and in vivo research on multiple RGD 
peptides190 supplied by Merck.  These experiments focused on 
EMD 66203 and two closely related derivatives and were designed 
to evaluate the “suitability of each of the peptides as potential drug 
candidates.”191  “The tests measured the efficacy, specificity, and 
toxicity” of the candidates as well as “their mechanism of action 
and pharmacokinetics” with the purpose of selecting the “most 
promising candidate “for clinical trials192.  These “optimization” 
studies were not exempt under the Federal Circuit’s ruling.193 
The scope of the safe harbor, however, does have limits.  For 
example, the Supreme Court did not “quibble” with the Federal 
Circuit’s holding that “the exemption ‘does not globally embrace 
all experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, 
may lead to an FDA approval process’.”194  If one assumes that 
“basic scientific research” as defined by the Court is not exempt 
(discussed infra), the key issue is how much “trial and error,” 
albeit on “potential drug candidates,” is exempt from 
infringement?  It would seem that research specifically directed to 
a limited class of drug candidates, e.g., those sharing a common 
structure, or those operating via the same pathway, to determine 
the “best candidate” might well be exempt.  The more limited the 
“class,” the more likely the research will be exempt. 
6. Basic Scientific Research 
“Basic scientific research,” as that term is defined by the 
Supreme Court, is “surely not ‘reasonably related to the 
 
 188 Id. at 2383 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added)). 
 189 See id. at 2383. 
 190 Id. at 2378. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 2382.  
 194 Id.  (quoting Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003)) (citation omitted). 
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development and submission of information’ to the FDA” and thus 
is not within the safe harbor.195 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the exemption “does not 
globally embrace all experimental activity that at some 
point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval 
process.”196 
We do not quibble with [this] statement.  Basic scientific 
research on a particular compound, performed without the 
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief 
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological 
effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not 
“reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information” to the FDA.197 
A few key questions remain: What constitutes “basic scientific 
research”?  In particular, what is considered research “on a 
particular compound”?  What constitutes a “reasonable belief”?  
Moreover, during so-called basic research, scientists usually 
“inten[d] to develop a particular drug.”198  Otherwise, he or she 
would not engage in the research-at-issue.  But does this “intent” 
exempt all drug discovery efforts?  The specific facts in Merck 
should be considered in answering these questions.  There, the 
alleged infringing research had progressed significantly by 1995—
the point in time when the parties disputed whether the safe harbor 
became applicable.199  At that time, the number of potential drug 
candidates was limited, and the preclinical research focused on 
selecting the “most promising candidate” for testing in humans.200  
This conduct is certainly not what many would consider “basic 
scientific research.” 
Since the Supreme Court relied heavily on the views expressed 
in the U.S. government’s amicus curiae brief, it is noteworthy that 
the government took the position that once a “researcher begins 
 
 195 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)) (2000)). 
 196 Id. (quoting Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867). 
 197 Id. (emphasis added). 
 198 Id. 
 199 See id. at 2379. 
 200 See id. at 2378. 
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attempting to develop a substance with specific characteristics in 
order to achieve a specific objective, the research is protected.”201  
In support of its position, the government quoted an FDA guideline 
that “[m]any drugs . . . are introduced into development based on 
knowledge of in vitro receptor binding properties . . . .”202  As to 
screening, the government proposed the following: 
“[S]creening” of compounds for use in a particular drug, 
including testing designed to compare the effects of 
different compounds is reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information to the FDA 
because it allows the researcher to identify the appropriate 
compound or compounds to submit.  The court of appeals’ 
contrary view would eviscerate the exemption with respect 
to non-generic drugs, because a researcher would always 
have to conduct infringing tests before its work would 
qualify for the exemption. 
. . . . 
. . . As long as a scientist is working on developing a 
particular drug . . . the number of compounds screened has 
nothing to do with whether the screening was reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information 
to the FDA.  Instead, it reflects the luck (or intuition) of the 
scientist, or the difficulty of the task.203 
It would appear that the Supreme Court, at least implicitly, 
rejected the government’s broad interpretation of the safe harbor, 
as is reflected in the Court’s exclusion of “basic scientific 
research” from the exemption.204 
 
 201 Brief for the United States, supra note 58, at 17. 
 202 Id. at 12 (quoting FDA, Guidance for Industry Exposure–Response Relationships—
Study Design Data Analysis, and Regulatory Applications 3 (Apr. 2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns /exposure.htm). 
 203 Id. at 18–19. 
 204 See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2005).  The 
American Intellectual Property Law Association [hereinafter AIPLA] argued that “early 
drug discovery activity” conducted “merely to identify promising candidates for further 
study” is not within the safe harbor. Brief for AIPLA as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 2, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) 
(No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Brief for AIPLA]. 
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7. Research Tool Patents 
No definitive answer on the status of such patents vis-à-vis the 
safe harbor was provided.  In a footnote, the Court stated: 
We therefore need not—and do not—express a view about 
whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from 
infringement the use of “research tools” in the development 
of information for the regulatory process.205 
In that same footnote, the Court cited Judge Newman’s 
dissenting opinion that the “[u]se of an existing tool in one’s 
research is quite different from the study of the tool itself.”206  
Thus, in view of the footnote, the fact that the Integra patents were 
viewed by Court as product patents, and that the alleged 
infringement was the use of the patented peptides as products 
rather than as tools, any conclusions regarding research tool 
patents are dicta.  Regardless, the Federal Circuit has recognized 
that it is “obliged to follow . . . clearly articulated Supreme Court 
dicta.”207  Of course, whether dicta is “clearly articulated” is yet 
another question. 
Whether accused conduct is exempt should not depend on 
whether a “research tool” is used to conduct the alleged infringing 
research.  Rather, the determination should be based on whether 
the conduct itself is within the safe harbor.  If the conduct is not 
exempt, the exemption will not apply.  If the conduct is exempt, 
 
 205 Merck KgAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7. 
 206 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
Section 271(e)(1) uses the term “patented invention” and makes no distinction between 
the types of patents covered by the exemption. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2003).  The 
legislative history of § 271(e)(1), however, supports an argument differentiating between 
research tool patents and other types of patents.  See supra discussion in notes 99 and 
109.  The AIPLA asserted that “[h]igh–throughput screening techniques” are not exempt 
because “[t]heir principal goal is the identification of candidates. . . [for] further 
testing . . . .” Brief for AIPLA, supra note 204, at 20.  Similarly, the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization [hereinafter BIO] maintained that its “members generally, though 
not uniformly, agree that screening large numbers of compounds not known or 
reasonably expected to have a particular effect . . . is rarely if ever within the ambit of the 
Section 271(e)(1) safe harbor.”  Brief for BIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 14, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–
1237). 
 207 Independent Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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however, the mere fact that a research tool patent is involved 
should not automatically preclude application of the safe harbor.  
For example, if a tool is used merely to confirm the results of a 
clinical trial, an argument exists that the activity is exempt.  Of 
course, hypotheticals yielding unforeseen results, such as using 
patented pipettes during clinical trials can be envisioned.  Does 
such conduct infringe?  Would it matter whether the patented 
pipettes were absolutely necessary to confirm the results of the 
clinical trials?  Regardless, since the types of conduct covered by 
the safe harbor exemption were broadened by the Court, the rights 
of research tool patentees were diminished correspondingly. 208 
IV. A PROPOSED “TEST” FOR APPLYING THE SAFE HARBOR 
In limiting the scope of the safe harbor, the Court noted that 
“[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed 
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable 
belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect 
the research intends to induce is surely not” within the safe 
harbor.209  However, the provision does exempt conduct: 
[W]here a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing 
that a patented compound may work, through a particular 
biological process, to produce a particular physiological 
effect, and uses the compound in research that, if 
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission 
to the FDA . . . .210 
In differentiating what is protected from what is not, the 
following standard emerges: before the safe harbor applies, the 
researcher must have a “reasonable belief” or “a reasonable basis 
for believing” that the particular compound, or compounds, being 
 
 208 The government raised the possibility that research tool patents are not covered by 
the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor, in which case the exemption provided by the safe harbor 
would never apply to such patents, and all unauthorized uses of research tools would be 
infringing. See Brief for the United States, supra note 58, at 28–29.  This view has not 
been accepted. 
 209 Merck KgAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 210 Id. at 2383. 
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tested will produce a “particular physiological effect.”211  This 
formulation is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s statement, 
approved by the Supreme Court, that “the exemption ‘does not 
globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point, 
however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.’”212  
The second requirement the Court imposed, that the resulting 
information “be appropriate”213 for FDA submission, is seemingly 
unnecessary.214  If the resulting information were required by the 
FDA, or if it could be submitted, even if not actually required, a 
stronger argument could be made that the safe harbor applies to the 
accused conduct. 
If this “test” is applied to the facts in Merck, the result is clear.  
Based upon their earlier research, Scripps’ scientists had a 
“reasonable belief” or “reasonable basis for believing” that the 
“particular compounds” being tested would cause “the sort of 
physiological effect” they were investigating.215  The alleged 
infringing research was designed to evaluate “ the suitability of 
each of the peptides as potential drug candidates.”216  The research, 
as summarized by the Supreme Court, was not “general biomedical 
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds,” as 
characterized by the Federal Circuit.217  Rather, it was performed 
with “a reasonable belief that the compound[s] will cause the sort 
of physiological effect the research intends to induce. . . .” 218 
The jury instructions approved by the Supreme Court were 
based on those used in Intermedics.219  They read: 
 
 211 See id. at 2382–83. 
 212 Id. at 2382 (quoting Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 213 Id. at 2383.  The first requirement, that the drug work “through a particular 
biological process,” would seem to be unnecessary as well, except to the extent that such 
information would assist in forming a “reasonable belief” that the candidate compound 
would produce a particular physiological effect. Id. 
 214 See discussion supra Part IV.C.4. 
 215 See Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382–83. 
 216 Id. at 2378. 
 217 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 218 Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 219 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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To prevail on this [§ 271(e)(1)] defense, the [defendant] 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would be objectively reasonable for a party in 
[defendant’s] . . . situation to believe that there was a 
decent prospect that the accused activities would 
contribute, relatively directly, to the generation of the kinds 
of information that are likely to be relevant in the process 
by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the 
product in question.” 
. . . . 
[Defendant] does not need to show that the information 
gathered from a particular activity was actually submitted 
to the FDA.220 
The Intermedics test involves interpreting the terms 
“reasonable,” “objectively,” “decent prospect,” “relatively 
directly,” and “information . . . likely to be relevant.”221  The test is 
inherently ambiguous, even though the resulting information need 
not be submitted to the FDA.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
supports an alternative instruction that focuses on whether there is 
a “reasonable basis for believing” that the compound(s) at issue 
will produce a “particular physiological effect” and, if so, whether 
the information obtained from the research would be “appropriate” 
for an FDA submission.  As previously noted, the “submission” 
prong of the test may well be unnecessary. 
The Supreme Court’s formulation is more precise than that in 
Intermedics.  Certainly, its application, which focuses primarily on 
the “reasonable belief” of the researcher, is more direct, since the 
types of protectable information (e.g., safety, efficacy, 
pharmacology, toxicology, pharmacokinetics, metabolism, 
mechanism of action, etc.) will usually not be determinative.  This 
formulation is broader than one based on the Federal Circuit’s 
Integra decision, but significantly narrower than one based on 
Bristol-Myers v. Rhone Poulenc Rorer.222  It clearly exempts the 
 
 220 Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2379 (citation omitted). 
 221 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280. 
 222 No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
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research at issue in Merck v. Integra, but would not exempt “basic 
scientific research” as the Supreme Court has defined this term. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Merck v. Integra Lifesciences 
answers a number of questions regarding the scope of the safe 
harbor provision.  Where the decision does not provide a clear 
answer, such as, for example, on the question of what constitutes 
“basic scientific research,” the formulation the decision proposes 
provides more predictability than the present Intermedics standard.  
Even more certainty, however, may be forthcoming.  On August 
17, 2005, the Federal Circuit, having received the certified 
judgment of the Supreme Court, returned the case to the original 
merits panel, and set dates for the filing of new briefs “with 
particular attention [to be] paid to the Supreme Court decision.”223  
Significantly, the “court sua sponte allow[ed] amicus briefs.”224  
The Federal Circuit may thus soon answer the questions that the 
Supreme Court did not address fully; and in particular, reach a 
determination as to the applicability of the safe harbor exemption 
to “basic scientific research” and research tools. 
 
 
 223 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA,, Nos. 02–1052, 02–1065, 2005 WL 
1965928, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2005). 
 224 Id. 
